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God as a Lobby
Kathleen M. Sullivant
The Culture of Disbelief How American Law and Politics Trivialize

Religious Devotion. Stephen L. Carter. Basic Books, 1993. Pp vii, 328.
The President of the United States rarely recommends a
book to the reading public, so Stephen Carter can count President Clinton's recent recommendation of The Culture of Disbelief
at a prayer breakfast as a blessing.' Or a curse, for the
President's enthusiasm for the book might be thought to undermine Carter's central descriptive claim: that religion is excessively marginalized in American public life. If the President himself
publicly cites a book urging Americans to take religious devotion
seriously, how marginal can religion really be? In Carter's view,
dangerously marginal-notwithstanding the President's revival of
forthright religiosity on the Democratic side of the aisle, the
copious airtime that Republicans have given to God in recent
presidential campaigns, and the political prominence of clerics
from Pat Robertson to Jesse Jackson.
2
Indeed, in Carter's view, contemporary political "God-talk,"
far from being part of the solution, is itself part of the problem.
Some contemporary religious rhetoric, Carter suggests, amounts

t Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
1 See Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, NY Times 8 (Sept 4, 1993).
2 Carter defines "God-talk" as "public discussion in explicitly religious terms, rather
than, for example, in the generalized spiritual terms with which Americans are often
more comfortable" (p 49).
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to mere "ritualistic incantations of the civil religion," in which
"God is thanked for the success of an enterprise" (p 52) such as
Desert Storm (p 54) or "God is asked to bless the nation, its people, and its leaders" (p 52). Such "faintly Protestant platitudes [ I
reaffirm the religious base of American culture" but lack "theological significance" (p 51).'
In other instances, Carter argues, "political preachers"
trivialize faith by hitching their political causes cravenly to the
"Word of God" (p 68), as if "the will of God is not discerned by the
faithful but created by them" (p 73). For example, "[President]
Reagan became God's candidate" not because of his personal
piety (he was not a churchgoer), but because churchmen of the
religious right viewed him as "politically correct" (p 98).
Finally, Carter claims, some contemporary "God-talk" is
sincerely and nontrivially religious, but causes understandable
"public revulsion" (p 20). He cites as recent examples the "terrifying and outrageous" death sentence pronounced in 1989 by Ayatollah Khomeini upon author Salman Rushdie for blasphemy (p
10), and the "scary religious rhetoric of the 1992 Republican
Convention," which issued "calls for a jeremiad" in God's name (p
20).
Carter is all for God-talk in the public square-but a kinder,
gentler God-talk. He is concerned that the "excesses of some
Christian fundamentalists" have "driven the left to shed religion
like a second skin" (p 99). He cautions liberals against
demonizing religiosity itself as right wing, citing anti-Vietnam
War activism and especially the civil rights movement as powerful examples of religiosity deployed in the service of "vital
cause[s]" of the left (see pp 49, 59-60, 63-64, 227-29).
Dysfunctional God-talk is bad enough, but public silence
about religion, in Carter's view, is even worse. He suggests that
religious devotion has been driven into the closet. While most
Americans admit they are religious, they practice their faith in
private, keeping their convictions to themselves in their public
interactions. Who silences religion? The cultural elite: academics,
the media, and "well-educated professionals" stand ready to ridicule anyone who claims to hold a political position "because it is
required by [his or her] understanding of God's will" (p 23). Thus,
according to Carter, the family that prays together may stay
together, but it keeps that fact to itself.

' Quoting Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical,
20 Cap U L Rev 113, 122 (1991).
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Such privatization, Carter suggests, exacts two costs. The
first is personal and psychological: by requiring a religious person
to "'bracket' religious convictions from the rest of her personality," we force her to "split off a part of her self" (p 56).' Like any
kind of silencing or closeting, this causes cognitive dissonance,
and, Carter suggests, unfair hardship. The second cost is political
and systemic: the bracketing of religion in public moral discourse,
he implies, impoverishes the quality of the discourse itself (see pp
80, 229).
Carter's book seeks solutions to this contemporary religious
malaise. It is lucid and engaging, written in an accessibly conversational and often personal style.5 It steers away from conceptual extremes and toward a middle ground. It is ornery and
contrarian. It defies conventional wisdom. It resists pat answers
and political pigeonholing. These very virtues, however, also
make the book unsystematic and at times maddeningly elusive.
Carter often seems deliberately unwilling to state his bottom
line, and backs off from endorsing outright the conclusions that
his arguments seem to dictate. It takes some work to weave the
book's various strands into a tight argument. As I read it, that
argument is as follows.
In answer to our religious malaise, we need a theory of the
role of religion in politics. That general theory will yield particular prescriptions for a cure. Carter's theory is that religious communities serve as valuable mediating institutions between individuals and government in the democratic state. Carter prescribes that we change our culture and our constitutional law to
ensure that religion can serve that mediating function. This will
entail allowing religion to opt out of more aspects of the modern
regulatory and welfare state, while at the same time increasing
openly religious participation in secular politics.
I. RELIGIONS AS DEMOCRATIC INTERMEDIARIES

Carter sees religions as communal associations that serve as
buffers between the individual and the state.6 "Faith communi-

'

Citing Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law: A Bicentennial Essay 72-73

(Oxford, 1988).
' The reader learns, for example, that Carter is a practicing Episcopalian (p 75), that

he and his wife and children "pray before important events: meals, trips, sleepr (p 185),
and that his children attend a private religious school where they "pray in school, in an
organized fashion, each morning before classes begin" (p 184).
' Carter derives this view, in part, by "translating Tocqueville's observations to the
present day" (p 36).
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ties" (p 38) serve as "independent centers of power" (p 35) and
therefore as "bulwarks against state authority" (p 85). Like "political parties" or "civic clubs" (p 37), they help "fill the vast space
between the people and the government created in their name" (p
36), thus keeping government in its place. Carter speaks of religions in democracy as Madison did of "factions" in the "extended
sphere."7 Religions, according to Carter, "promote freedom and
reduce the likelihood of democratic tyranny by splitting the allegiance of citizens" (p 37). They also "mediate between the citizen
and the apparatus of government, providing an independent
moral voice" (pp 36-37).
Religions best fulfill their function of checking state power,
Carter suggests, when they cultivate actual resistance to "approved state policy" (p 37).' "Anyone who believes deeply is a
potential martyr" who might "refus [e] to yield to what [I] society
demands" (p 42). Thus, "religion, properly understood, is a very
subversive force" (p 43 (emphasis omitted)) because "[f]or some it
is more real than the state" (p 41) and commands superior allegiance.
Religion's powers of mediation and resistance, Carter suggests, depend upon its epistemological autonomy. Religions are
not just separate loci of power but "independent sources of meaning" (p 40). They enable the religiously devout to "see many
things differently from the way their fellow citizens do" (p 37,
emphasis added). Religion is "an alien way of knowing the
world.., in a political and legal culture in which reason supposedly rules" (p 43). Carter writes that creationists, for example,
are "not a superstitious rabble" but rather "independent
thinkers" with "their own means for seeking knowledge" and thus
their own "world view" (p 179). The power of religions to contest
state policy derives from their ability "to discover meanings that
are in competition with those imposed by the state" (p 273).
If religion is to retain this power to generate "alternative
meanings" (id), Carter argues, it must shield itself from the
infiltration of secular knowledge. Carter deplores those "political
preachers" who "adjust[ ] the interpretation of the Word to meet
the demands of the faithful" (pp 74, 68-74). He likewise admon-

7 See Federalist 10 (Madison), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 83
(Mentor, 1961) ("Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens .. ").
8 The "resistance" concept is borrowed from David Tracy, Pluralityand Ambiguity:
Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope 83-84 (Harper & Row, 1987). See also p 41.
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ishes religious practitioners that "there is a vital difference between a political inspiration that is fired by one's deepest religious beliefs and a claim of religious belief that is fired by a preexisting political commitment" (p 80). His concern here is not
that religion corrupts politics but that politics corrupts faith; the
quest for religious knowledge is tainted when influenced by secular concerns. When preachers manipulate the faith for political
ends, Carter "tremble[s] for their souls" (p 47).
Carter expresses confidence that scriptural interpretation
can be performed in isolation from political commitments. For
example, in deciding to favor ordination of women by his own
Episcopal church, he says that he reasoned in purely "theological
terms" (p 77). Upon "prayerful consideration," he determined that
"the revealed Word of God, Holy Scripture, creates [no] explicit
bar" to this practice (pp 75, 77). His view, he asserts, followed
from "the will of God," not "the rights of women" (id), though he
acknowledges that one might in good faith reach the opposite
scriptural conclusion.
What are the legal consequences of Carter's theory of religions as mediating institutions? His emphasis on the need for
religions to maintain epistemological autonomy leads him to
favor a broad interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. He
believes, of course, that intentional discrimination against a
religion's practices based on secular condemnation of its world
view is plainly impermissible. For example, he heartily approves
the Court's invalidation of the ordinances barring Santeria
practitioners from the ritual sacrifice of animals in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City of Hialeah.9 But Carter apparently would go further. He would also invalidate some government actions with a disproportionate adverse effect on religious
practice, regardless of intent (p 132-33). Thus, Carter implies
that he would have granted the free exercise claims of Yurok,
Karok, and Tolowa Indians in Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association1" against federal logging and road building in a national forest area that they used for sacred rituals (pp
131, 269)."

' 113 S Ct 2217 (1993). The Lukumi Babalu Aye case is noted at p 124 n 45, and
discussed approvingly in Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrectionof Religious Freedom?, 107
Harv L Rev 118, 123-26 (1993).
'0 485 US 439 (1988).

"' See also Carter, 107 Harv L Rev at 130 (arguing that "the test of government
motivation is no better for assessing free exercise claims than for evaluating charges of
racial discrimination," and therefore that, "if the state knows in advance that its logging
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Carter likewise favors "a wider set of religious exemptions
from laws of general application" than the Supreme Court currently recognizes (pp 125-26). While preferring political accommodations where possible, he recognizes that legislatures are unlikely to accommodate politically marginal religions, and thus
favors a stronger constitutional role for courts (pp 128-29). He
strongly implies that he would have allowed Air Force Captain
(and ordained rabbi) S. Simcha Goldman to wear his yarmulke
despite military headgear regulations in Goldman v
Weinberger' (pp 12, 132, 269). He also apparently would have
13
come out the other way in Employment Division v Smith,
which allowed Oregon to deny unemployment compensation to
Native Americans who lost their state jobs for ingesting peyote in
violation of state drug laws (see pp 126-33).
Carter chooses similar sides in other recent controversies yet
unconsidered by the Supreme Court. He expresses strong support
for allowing a landlord to refuse on religious grounds to rent to
an unmarried couple (pp 137-38, 144-45), and for allowing the
Ancient Order of Hibernians to refuse to let an Irish gay group
march in a St. Patrick's Day parade (pp 33-34, 148-49). State
antidiscrimination or public accommodation laws, he suggests,
ought to yield to conscientious religious objections to being associated with the sins of fornication and homosexuality.
Carter similarly writes that "parents should be entitled to
broad rights to exempt their children from educational programs
to which they raise religious objections" (p 174). Such opt-out
rights preserve the "epistemological diversity" that enables religions to serve as buffers between individuals and the state (id).
This suggests that he would allow fundamentalist parents to
withdraw their children from reading classes where they believe
"secular humanism" is taught, or Catholic parents to keep their
children out of sex-education classes that distribute condoms but
refuse to teach abstinence (see pp 171-72, 200-03). In the toughest test case of epistemological disagreement-the religious
practitioner's refusal of life-saving medical treatment on religious
grounds-Carter strongly implies (without quite declaring) that
the state ought not compel the religionist to "save the (corporeal)

and road building through sacred grounds may destroy the religious traditions of three
Indian tribes, a mere showing that the policy was adopted in spite of, rather than because
of, that effect should not be enough to save it").
12 475 US 503 (1986).
13 494 US 872 (1990).
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life" of herself or her children at the expense of their "life eternal" (pp 219-24).
II. RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SQUARE

While politics should not infect religious judgment, Carter
argues, religious judgment should freely enter into political debate. In his ideal state, religious intermediaries "would much
influence government," although "government would little
influence them" (p 150). Thus, Carter would reverse the direction
of the "bracketing" he observes in the interaction between religion and politics. In his view, the faithful should bracket their
political commitments more than they currently do when they
are engaged in religious activity, but they should cease having to
bracket their religious commitments when they participate in the
public square.
In advocating greater open participation of religious communities in secular politics, Carter adds his voice to a growing chorus of religious commentators favoring the translation of religious commitments into public policy. Ruti Teitel labels this
tendency (which she critiques) the "new engagement," and notes
that it spans "religious [ ] communities from politically conservative evangelical [Protestant] churches to the politically liberal
branches of the Catholic church." 4 Proponents of this greater
religious engagement in politics, Carter among them, reject a
rigid distinction between private and public, garden and wilderness, church and state." They reject the separationist model,
forged on theological grounds by the Protestant faiths dominant
at the founding, that favors privatized religious life and the withdrawal of religion from public affairs. 6
Carter thus fundamentally disagrees with liberal theorists
who would require religious arguments to be translated into the
terms of secular public reason before they are advanced in political debate (see p 230).'" In his view, the state should not require

14

Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politicsin the Public Sphere, 78 Cornell L Rev

747, 760 (1993). See also id at 756-65.
15 Leading manifestoes of the new engagement include Richard John Neuhaus, The
Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Eerdmans, 1984); Michael J.
Perry, Love and Power: The Role of Religion and Morality in American Politics (Oxford,
1991); and The Williamsburg Charter Foundation, The Williamsburg Charter(1988), reprinted in 8 J L & Religion 5 (1990).
l' See Teitel, 78 Cornell L Rev at 762-63 & nn 48-51.
17 For various versions of the argument that legislation must be either motivated or
justified by secular objectives, see John Rawls, Political Liberalism 235-44 (Columbia,
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that political arguments be secularly motivated, nor should it
even demand that state action grounded on religious arguments
be capable of an independently sufficient secular rationale. He
sides with Michael Perry, who would allow religious citizens to
make expressly religious arguments for political outcomes and
who views lawmaking on openly religious grounds as properly
justified. 8 Anything less forces religious citizens "to split off
vital comporents of their personalities" (p 230), or even "to remake themselves before they are allowed to press policy arguments" (p 56). This puts them at an unfair political disadvantage
in relation to nonreligious citizens who do not face such psychic
burdens.
Carter gives an extremely sketchy account of how such openly religious public dialogue would work, or how it would differ
from current approaches. He says more about what we should
not do than what we should. As a first principle, we should not
rule out of bounds a religious motivation for an argument. If we
wish to attack arguments made from religious premises, we
should attack their substance, not the religious nature of their
source (see pp 49, 229, 261, 266). Additionally, mere "tolerance"
of explicitly religious argument is inadequate, for it implies that
those who do the tolerating are superior to those whom they
suffer (see pp 92-96). Rather, there must be some kind of public
embrace of "epistemic diversity," in which the political sphere
"accepts whatever form of dialogue" the "religiously devout.., member of the public offers" (p 230).
Carter suggests that such religious arguments-without
translation into secular terms-may rightfully be the basis for
laws. He suggests that it is futile to argue that religious individuals ought not impose their moral judgments on others through
law, for "society imposes moral judgments all the time," and
those judgments are already pervasively "informed by religious
belief" (p 256-57). Carter would simply let these religious underpinnings be openly exposed.

1993); Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 3-30 (Yale, 1980); Bruce A.
Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J Phil 5, 17-18 (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice 50-51, 145-52 (Oxford, 1988); Robert Audi, The Separationof
Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 Phil & Pub Aff 259, 277-90
(1989). But see Paul J. Weithman, The Separation of Church and State: Some Questions
for ProfessorAudi, 20 Phil & Pub Aff 52, 58-65 (1991). See also Joseph Raz, FacingDiver.
sity: The Case for EpistemicAbstinence, 19 Phil & Pub Aff 3 (1990); John Rawls, The Idea
of an OverlappingConsensus, 7 Oxford J Legal Stud 1 (1987).
" See Perry, Love and Power at 83-127 (cited in note 15).
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In what ways would Carter change Establishment Clause
doctrine in order to increase freedom for religious participation in
public life? Surprisingly few, given the long windup. For example,
Carter supports the Supreme Court's decisions barring organized
prayer in public schools (pp 188-89)-although he might go the
other way in Stone v Graham,9 which barred a classroom posting of the Ten Commandments (see p 189). He would go even less
far than the Court in permitting public symbolic religious displays: he views publicly funded creches as wholly impermissible,
and so seems to view Lynch v Donnelly" as wrongly decided
(see pp 94-95, 113-14).
As Carter necessarily acknowledges, the Supreme Court has
already permitted considerable freedom for religious engagement
in politics by reading the establishment bar narrowly. For example, he notes that the Court has declined to hold restrictive abortion laws invalid as establishments merely because they "coincide
with the religious tenets of the Roman Catholic Church" (p
255).21 And the Court has permitted religious organizations substantial access to public programs and facilities on the same
terms as nonreligious participants.
In the end, Carter finds only two major sticking points in
current Establishment Clause doctrine. First, he argues, contra
Lemon v Kurtzman,' that secular motivation should not be necessary to defeat an Establishment Clause claim (p 113). Thus, in
his view, Edwards v Aguillard,' which invalidated a requirement of equal time for the teaching of creationism in public
schools, reached the right result but for the wrong reason: the
problem with the law was not religious motivation but "bad sci-

19 449 US 39 (1980).
20 465 US 668 (1984).
21

Citing Harrisv McRae, 448 US 297, 320 (1980).

' The Court has found no impermissible establishment in the inclusion of religious
organizations in some public programs. See, for example, Bowen v Kendrick, 487 US 589
(1988) (upholding a grant of federal funds for adolescent sex education to religious organizations preaching abstinence). The Court has also found exclusion of religion from some
public forums to be a violation of First Amendment guarantees of free speech. See, for
example, Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981) (invalidating the exclusion of worship
groups from public university facilities open to extracurricular use by social or political
student groups); Lamb's Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free School District, 113 S Ct
2141 (1993) (invalidating the exclusion of an evangelical group's film about the family
from an evening film series open to secular organizations). In each of these cases the
Court rejected the government's claim that the exclusion was compelled by the Establishment Clause.
2 403 US 602 (1971).
24 482 US 578 (1987).
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ence" (see pp 111, 161, 168-69). As Carter would still not change
the outcome, though, one wonders how much his approach would
mollify creationists.
Second, he hints that he might find vouchers or other public
financial support for religious schools constitutional. Here too,
however, he hedges his position carefully and confines himself to
stating only that if vouchers were allowed for nonreligious private schools, then religious schools should not be excluded (p
1 9 4 ).' Other than these two points, his prescriptions for increasing religious participation in public life appear to be more
cultural than legal.
III. ARE RELIGIOus AUTONOMY AND PARTICIPATION
COMPATIBLE?

The two strands of Carter's argument, once disentangled,
appear to be in considerable tension. On the one hand, he wants
religions to be more autonomous from dominant political and
moral conceptions in order to increase epistemological diversity
and check the power of the state. On the other hand, he wants
religions to enter actively into political debate and contribute to
forging state policy. These two roles for religion, however, might
well be incompatible.
Carter's position lies uneasily between two logically coherent
positions on the interaction between religious autonomy and
political participation. The first is the separationist position prevalent in preconstitutional American thought26 and dominant in

' Carter appears to read Mueller v Allen, 463 US 388 (1983) (permitting parents to
deduct parochial school tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses from their income
taxes), as entailing that including religious schools in voucher programs would not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause. See p 194 ("[Ihf voucher programs are established, the Supreme Court was right to hold that religious schools can be included as a
constitutional matter....').
In fact, this is far from clear. True, since Mueller, the Court has upheld some additional instances of financial aid to students attending parochial schools. See Witters v
Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 US 481 (1986) (upholding the payment of vocational-education funds to a blind student studying for the ministry at a
Christian school); Zobrest v CatalinaFoothills School Dist, 113 S Ct 2462 (1993) (upholding the public finding of a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student attending a Roman Catholic high school). But, in making those rulings, the Court continued to emphasize facts that might not be present in voucher schemes, especially the minimal financial
benefit conferred upon the religious school. See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of
Separationism,62 Geo Wash L Rev 230, 263-64 (1994) ("How the tension between neutrality and separationism will work out in the field of educational finance, in which the roots
of separationism are deepest, remains an open question.").
26 See Teitel, 78 Cornell L Rev at 756-59 (cited in note 14) (summarizing sources).
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the Supreme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence from roughly
the 1940s through the 1970s. The second is the assimilationist
approach that has prevailed on the Court more recently.
The separationist view of the Establishment Clause is encapsulated in the oft-quoted dictum in Everson v Board of Education: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a
wall of separation between church and State. ' "' The "wall"
privatizes religion by dividing the kingdom of God, in which
religious practice is to be voluntary and free from government
regulation, from the affairs of the secular state."
The separationist view dictates strong prohibitions on state
involvement in or aid to religion." As a corollary, it excludes religion from the political fray-government shall not participate in
religious affairs and vice versa. But separationism is entirely
compatible with strong free exercise rights, including compelled
religious exemptions from general laws.3 Free exercise autonomy compensates for the exclusion of religion from directly shaping political outcomes. As I have argued elsewhere in support of
a version of separationism, the price of the Establishment Clause
is the banishment of religion from the civil public order, but the
reward should be that religious subcultures may withdraw from
public regulation insofar as compatible with that civil order.32
Precisely because religious imperatives are disabled from driving

2

See Lupu, 62 Geo Wash L Rev at 233-37 (cited in note 25).

330 US 1, 16 (1947) (upholding public expenditures for the transportation of students to parochial schools).
' See Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American ConstitutionalHistory 5-18 (Chicago, 1965).
' See Everson, 330 US at 16 ("No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."). As the result in Everson illustrates,
however, what constitutes a forbidden public subsidy to religion is contestable, no matter
how clear the principle against them.
31 See Lupu, 62 Geo Wash L Rev at 236 (cited in note 25). But see Jesse H. Choper,
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U Pitt L Rev
673, 696-700 (1980). On the consistency of religious exemptions with the views of the
Framers, see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv L Rev 1410, 1511-13 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U Chi L Rev 1109, 1133-36, 1149-52
(1990).
' See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U Chi L Rev 195,
222 (1992). See also Abner S. Greene, The PoliticalBalance of the Religion Clauses, 102
Yale L J 1611, 1614-33 (1993).
2
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secular law, religious communities must be afforded significant
leeway for an exit from secular law's commands."
While the separationist view entails strong judicial policing
of both establishment and free exercise, an opposite but equally
logically coherent position would call for weak judicial intervention under both clauses. This view assimilates religion into politics. Religious entities may freely participate in politics alongside
other competitors, and bring home their share of the spoils.
When they do, the Establishment Clause will not stop them, so
long as religious beneficiaries are treated no better than others.
On this view, government neutrality toward religion is recast
from a requirement that religion be withdrawn from the public
sphere to a requirement that it be equally treated there.
This assimilationist view arguably best describes the trend
in the Supreme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence since the
1980s.34 The Court has relaxed Establishment Clause barriers
to religious participation in public programs, upholding a variety
of distributive schemes in which religious beneficiaries receive
benefits on an equal footing with nonreligious beneficiaries.35
The Court has also rejected the Establishment Clause as a basis
for excluding religious organizations from equal access to public
forums open to speech by nonreligious groups. 6 Thus the Court
has quite literally let religion into the supposedly naked public
square. 7
Religion's full and open participation in politics, however,
attenuates the case for compelled free exercise exemptions. On
the assimilationist view, religious communities that have an
equal shot at influencing political outcomes ex ante should not be
heard to complain of sour grapes ex post. If you have voice, who

' On this point, Carter misapprehends my position. He claims that I "suggest that a
religion should not be allowed to opt out of generally applicable secular regulations" (p 41)
(emphasis added). In fact, I suggest exactly the opposite, cautioning only that religionists
should not be allowed to withdraw from support of the civil public order through taxation.
See Sullivan, 59 U Chi L Rev at 220-22.
' See Lupu, 62 Geo Wash L Rev at 237-67 (cited in note 25) (labelling this approach
the "neutrality" position).
' See, for example, Zobrest, 113 S Ct 2462 (sign-language interpreter for deaf parochial high school student); Witters, 474 US 481 (vocational education grant to blind chaplaincy student); Kendrick, 487 US 589 (involvement of religious organizations in federally
funded adolescent sexuality and pregnancy program); Mueller, 463 US 388 (income tax
deductions for parochial school tuition, textbook, and transportation expenses).
' See Lamb's Chapel u Center Moriches Union Free School District, 113 S Ct 2141
(1993); Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981).
" See Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square at 211 (cited in note 15).
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needs exit? Religious equal opportunity in politics should lead to
deference to antireligious results.
Thus, on the assimilationist view, the Court decided Smith3 8
correctly. The political safeguards for religious freedom are
enough. Political redress is available to religious communities
seeking exemption from the drug or other general laws. Indeed,
religionists had widely succeeded in obtaining such exemptions in
states other than Oregon before Smith, 9 as they did in Oregon
after Smith." Nor are religious communities necessarily discrete
and insular minorities. Fringe religions often have powerful allies
in the mainstream religions who unite to guard vigilantly against
any infringement of the interests of institutional religion as a
whole. The ultimate illustration of the power of this ecumenical
religious lobby to protect its interests in politics was the passage
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993."' To an
assimilationist, the RFRA, by purporting to overrule Smith, paradoxically illustrates that the Smith Court's premises were correct.
As between these two coherent positions-banish religion
from politics but protect its right to flourish freely behind the
garden wall, or let religion enter into politics but make it take its
lumps-Carter chooses neither. He chooses instead a position in
between: weak on establishment but strong on free exercise anyway. From either of the two perspectives just described, this
looks like having one's cake and eating it too, but it might not
work that way in practice.
In several ways, religious participation in politics along the
lines Carter suggests might well undermine his vision of religious
autonomy. First, Carter's theory, if internalized by religious practitioners, might alter their self-conception. His theory of the
worth of religion in democracy is instrumental; it asks not what
religion can do for you but what religion can do for your country.
Conceiving of religion instrumentally, as a mediating institution
on par with political parties and trade associations, would arguably diminish the sense of its intrinsic worth.4 2 This in turn

' 494 US 872 (applying deferential rationality review to claimed free exercise exemption from drug laws).
" See id at 912 n 5 (Blackmun dissenting).
4
See Or Rev Stat § 475.992(5) (1993) (exempting from drug laws the use of peyote
"in connection with the good faith practice of a religious belief").
41 Pub L No 103-141, 107 Stat 1488, codified at 42 USC § 2000bb-4 (1993).
' For an extended critique of Carter's instrumental conception of religion in favor of
a Free Exercise theory of religion's intrinsic worth, see Scott C. Idleman, The Sacred, the
Profane, and the Instrumental: Valuing Religion in the Culture of Disbelief, 142 U Pa L
Rev 1313, 1348-59, 1367-79 (1994).
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would diminish religion's capacity to serve as an autonomous
source of values, standing apart from and potentially against the
state.4" The paradigmatic instances of religious resistance that
Carter celebrates-from Martin Luther to Martin Luther King,
Jr.-do not square with the image of clerics celebrating at a billsigning. God as a lobby might well be worse for religion than
"God as a hobby";" at least the latter preserves a sense of religion as a distinctive pursuit.
Second, conceiving of religion as a democratic intermediary
might have a homogenizing effect on differences among sects,
diminishing the epistemic diversity that is the key to Carter's
political theory of religion in the first place.4 5 As a practical matter, for religions to have any influential effect on politics and still
speak in a distinctively religious voice, they will have to establish
alliances that crosscut their heterogeneous creeds. At best, greater explicit religious representation in politics would require aggregating and trading off theological differences among religious
constituents. The more religions minimize their differences by
scaling back to their common denominators, however, the more
epistemic commonality they will express. At some point, religious
expression of this kind might become difficult to distinguish from
the "overlapping consensus" among moral views that the liberals
whom Carter criticizes find compatible with a separationist
state.4 6
At worst, this process would be not only homogenizing but
exclusionary. Some faiths will not make it into the mix. For example, some religious communities reject, on religious grounds,
Carter's conception of religious communities as mediating institutions.47 Consider, for example, the separationist Old Order
Amish who were granted an exemption from compulsory schooling in Wisconsin v Yoder," or the Satmar Hasidim whose self"' See id at 1355-58 (describing the adverse cultural consequences of
instrumentalism).
" The latter is Carter's term for the trivialization of religion. See pp 22, 23.
4' Compare Federalist 51 (Madison), in The FederalistPapersat 324 (cited in note 7)
("In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious
rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the
multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of
interests and sects . . .).
" The term "overlapping consensus" is Rawls's. See Rawls, 7 Oxford J Legal Stud at
1 (cited in note 17). See also Teitel, 78 Cornell L Rev at 787 (cited in note 14) ("Common
or shareable tenets will be those aligned with the norms of the political majority.").
" See Idleman, 142 U Pa L Rev at 1351-52 (cited in note 42); Teitel, 78 Cornell L Rev
at 809-11 (cited in note 14).
's 406 US 205 (1972).
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segregation was at issue in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v Grumet.49 Other religious communities
might accept the possibility of public participation, but refuse to
tone down messages rooted in absolute religious commands ranging from "abortion is murder" to "infidels must die." Carter
makes the sectarian bias of his model apparent when he condemns as "scary" or "outrageous" religions that preach messages
he himself condemns as sinfully intolerant. 0 The exclusion of
such messages would defeat the "epistemic diversity" of the project; inclusion, however, raises the prospect of impasse with nonbelievers. Epistemic diversity and religious political efficacy thus
might not both be possible at once.
CONCLUSION

Stephen Carter's dual recommendations for religious empowerment are on a mutual collision course. Autonomy and epistemic
diversity impede meaningful religious participation in general
politics, and vice versa. Treating religion as fungible with other
moral or philosophical strands in politics is likely to yield only
bland and minimal religio-moral consensus that pleases no sect.
But allowing religions to speak in politics with their distinctive
voices might yield irreducible conflict and impasse. Carter
downplays, and perhaps underestimates, our potential for religious strife (see, for example, p 140), and, ultimately, gives too
little consideration to the possibility that it is at least partly our
separationist culture that distinguishes us from Belfast,
Sarajevo, or Beirut.

49 114 S Ct 2481 (1994) (holding the creation of a public school district coextensive
with a Satmar Hasidim community an unconstitutional establishment of religion, despite
the Hasidim's contention that the district was a necessary accommodation of the religion's
distinctive and insular way of life).
' See text following note 3. For a similar critique of the "ecumenical politics" advocated by Michael Perry in Love and Power (cited in note 15), see Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 Harv L Rev 2061, 2073-76 (1992) (arguing
that Perry's model is implicitly sectarian in favoring the approaches of "fallibilist" sects

over "conservative" sects).

